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The Moral Significance of Boredom: An Introduction 
Andreas Elpidorou 
 
“Oh! Ennui! Ennui! What an answer to everything,” wrote French author Jules Barbey 
d’Aurevilly (quoted in Kuhn 1976, 332). In a sense, d’Aurevilly was right. Boredom can 
be thought to be an answer to everything because it arises in response to almost any 
situation. Given enough repetition or exposure, nearly everything can strike us as 
boring—even our dearest possessions, activities, ideas, or relations. But d’Aurevilly was 
also, in an important sense, wrong: although boredom can be a response to almost any 
situation, it is not necessarily a solution. In its wake, boredom leaves behind both 
beneficial and harmful outcomes. On the positive side, new habits, opportunities, and 
careers often start with the thought “I am bored.” The realization that we are bored can 
move us to form prosocial intentions and to find meaning in our situations. It can even be 
the spur we need in order to engage in creative acts. “I painted because I was bored,” G. 
W. Bush admitted in an interview (Bush 2017); “Perhaps some of the greatest 
masterpieces were written while yawning,” Marcel Proust (1982, 866) writes in his 
Remembrance. All the same, boredom has a darker side. Unhealthy eating habits, binge 
drinking, drug use, arson, the theft of a military tank, sadistic behavior, mass killings—all 
have been attributed to boredom. “I guess I was just bored,” Keith Eugene Mann said 
explaining why he scorched 16 acres of wild forests in North Carolina (Washburn and 
David 2016). “Fact is I had no reason to do it, I just thought … fuck it, life is boring so 
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why not?”, a gunman who killed twelve people posted on social media during the time of 
his despicable act (Baer 2018). 
Is boredom morally significant? It’s complicated. To be in a position to answer 
the question properly, we need to know what boredom is and what it means to say that a 
psychological phenomenon is morally significant. Yet, for some, the answer was always 
clear. Decades ago, Bertrand Russell (2006 [1930], 38) declared that “[b]oredom is a vital 
problem for the moralist since half the sins of mankind are caused by it.” Russell’s claim 
is, of course, an exaggeration (but see Fromm 1973). Nonetheless, his hyperbole is 
instructive. In trying to understand better our own psychology and role in our social 
context, we cannot afford to ignore boredom’s force. Indeed, Russell’s claim is a useful 
reminder of Søren Kierkegaard’s astute observation that despite its “calm and sedate 
nature,” boredom has a remarkable “capacity to initiate motion” (1987 [1843], 285). It is 
perhaps in its capacity to move us in various ways that we can discern most clearly 
boredom’s moral colors.  
Indeed, when thinking of boredom’s potential role in our moral existence, it is 
natural to focus on whether boredom can move us to act in moral or immoral ways. Yet 
there are additional ways of determining whether a psychological state or a personality 
trait carries moral significance. A psychological state or trait can be morally significant if 
any of the following theses is true: 
 
ACTION THESIS:  
The psychological state/personality trait can motivate prosocial or antisocial behavior.  
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JUDGMENT THESIS:  
The psychological state/personality trait can influence moral judgment.  
 
PERCEPTION THESIS:  
The psychological state/personality trait can facilitate (or hinder) moral perception—
the state or trait makes it more likely (or less likely) for the agent to perceive morally 
relevant situations and facts. 
 
FLOURISHING THESIS:  
The psychological state/personality trait can promote (or hinder) flourishing or the 
achievement of the good life.  
 
APPROPRIATENESS THESIS:  
The experience of the psychological state or the presence of the personality trait is 
morally inappropriate (or appropriate) insofar as one is, morally speaking, worse off 
(or better off) when experiencing the state or possessing the trait.  
 
The aim of this introduction is to discuss the ways in which boredom is morally 
significant. An additional but equally important aim is to introduce briefly the nature of 
boredom. This latter aim takes priority. Only once we have familiarized ourselves with 
the character of boredom, we can properly articulate boredom’s moral character.  
 
1. Acedia as a Moral Precursor  
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Traces of what we now call “boredom” can be found in ancient Greek and Roman 
thought (Kuhn 1976; O’Brien 2018; Toohey 1988, 2011). Plutarch, Lucretius, Horace, 
and Seneca give voice to this phenomenon, but the history of boredom, because of 
boredom’s relationship to sloth and idleness, can be traced even further back in time and 
outside of the Western civilization (Raposa 1999; Wishnitzer 2021).  
All the same, commentators often begin to document the history of boredom with 
a discussion of acedia, a type of religious boredom experienced, moralized, and, in some 
cases, literally demonized by the early Christian Fathers (Cassian 2000; Evagrius in 
Sinkewicz 2003; Jütte 2020; Wenzel 1967). Such a beginning point is, in a sense, a 
natural one. Within the Western tradition, the religious discourse on acedia is the first 
sustained discussion of the nature of boredom, including its effects, antecedents, and its 
relationship to other emotional and physical states. It is sophisticated, develops over 
centuries, and exposes plainly the moral significance of this type of boredom. For the 
founders of Christian monasticism and the third and fourth century hermits and cenobites 
of northern Egypt, acedia was a vice (or sin) and a threat to monastic life (Wenzel 1967; 
Bloomfield 1952). To be sieged by acedia (“the noonday demon” as it was then known) 
was a felt indication of one’s failure to perform one’s religious duties (Evagrius in 
Sinkewicz 2003, 102). When one contemplates and devotes oneself to God, one should 
not be bored with God; one ought not to be distracted, listless, slothful, never mind 
wishing for an alternative engagement. Hence, to be bored with, unexcited by, or even 
indifferent to God can mean only one thing: that one is failing to perform properly one’s 
religious duties. Worse, acedia was thought to be a condition that pervades all of 
monastic life. This demon “enveloping the entire soul and strangling the mind” (Evagrius 
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in Sinkewicz 2003, 104). It does not merely distract the monk temporarily; it tempts and 
tests the monk. It may even be the reason why the monk gives up the monastic life.  
Thus, the discourse on acedia reveals to us the fact that acedia (and thus spiritual 
or religious boredom) was a morally significant affective state. Although common 
enough in monastic circles, it was an inappropriate experience, not befitting of one’s role 
as a monk. And it was problematic because of its potential effects on the agent 
experiencing or besieged by acedia. Both its likening to a demon and its later 
transformation into a disease or a disorder underline the fact that acedia was conceived of 
as a threat to one’s self. 
The moral inappropriateness of the experience of acedia and its harmful or 
untoward consequences illustrate that this precursor of contemporary boredom is a 
morally significant phenomenon: both the ACTION THESIS and the APPROPRIATE THESIS are 
true for acedia. Hence, reflecting on the nature of acedia shows that we ought to take 
boredom seriously as a moral phenomenon. At the very least, the discourse on acedia 
reveals that the history of boredom involves a moral phenomenon. But the assessment 
that boredom is a morally significant phenomenon does not rest solely on boredom’s 
history and its presumed relation to acedia. Conceptual and empirical investigations into 
the nature of boredom also highlight its moral importance. 
 
 
2. Varieties of Boredom 
What is boredom? The term “boredom” is polysemic: the same term names and picks out 
many different phenomena. The polysemic character of “boredom” and the confusion that 
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it may engender have been noted in the literature before. Adams Phillips (1994) wrote 
that we should not speak of boredom but of “boredoms.” Otto Fenichel warned “that the 
conditions and forms of behavior called ‘boredom’ are psychologically quite 
heterogeneous” (Fenichel, 1951, p. 349). And others have distinguished between different 
types of boredom (see, e.g., Doehlemann 1991; Goetz et al. 2014; Healy 1984; Heidegger 
1995; Neu 2000; O’Brien this volume; Svendsen 2005). What is more, a look at the 
history of boredom shows that there exists a family of terms and phenomena that are 
either loosely or tightly connected to our concept of boredom. These include: horror loci, 
fastidium, acedia, tedium vitae, sloth, mal du siècle, melancholy, ennui, spleen, noia, 
monotony, and listlessness (Elpidorou and Ros Velasco in press). So, where does one 
begin with boredom? For present purposes, difficult questions concerning the history of 
this phenomenon and our linguistic practices about “boredom” and other semantically 
related terms will be put aside (see instead Goodstein 2005; Kuhn 1976; Petro 1993; 
Spacks 1995).  
This introduction does not address whether “boredom” means different things, nor 
does it consider the history and historicity of the phenomenon of boredom (see instead 
Ros Velasco this volume). Rather, the introduction sets to explore the moral nature of 
boredom as it is currently and widely experienced. Consequently, the introduction is 
tasked with explaining what our (contemporary) boredom is: What does it feel like? How 
does it affect us? Is it morally significant? 
Given the task at hand, it seems proper to start with the boredom with which we 
are most familiar: the everyday experience of boredom; our “ordinary” or “simple” 
boredom. This is the sort of experience that we undergo when, in our everyday dealings, 
The Moral Significance of Boredom 
 7 
we engage with the uninteresting, mundane, meaningless, or repetitive. We experience it, 
for instance, when we wait in a doctor’s office to be seen, when our flight is delayed, 
when we have to endure the same conversation for the umpteenth time, when we watch 
the same old rerun, when we scroll through our social media feed without purpose, or 
when we are forced to complete a mind-numbing task. Not only are most of us well 
acquainted with this type of boredom, it has also been the focus of a wave of a recent and 
historical experimental studies. For the most part, the type of boredom that psychologists 
induce in experimental settings and study either in such settings or in the wild is this 
simple or everyday boredom. Following common practice, I call this type of boredom 
“state boredom,” and I understand it to be a temporary affective state that is largely (but 
neither entirely nor invariably) dependent on external conditions.  
Alongside this familiar notion or understanding of boredom, others lurk in the 
offing. In particular, boredom researchers often talk of a different, more profound, type of 
boredom. Unfortunately, the label “profound boredom” has come to designate different 
affective phenomena, and discussions of boredom do not always keep those apart. For 
that reason, it is important to disambiguate between them (see also O’Brien this volume). 
Here I note six possible articulations of the notion of profound boredom. 
 
Type A: Profound because of its object. Boredom might turn profound depending 
on what bores us. We are often bored by events, tasks, or situations that do not 
hold any moral weight: a song, an outfit, a homework assignment, a work 
presentation, a bad comedy routine, a terrible book, or an unreadable introductory 
chapter. Sometimes, however, the object of our boredom can change into 
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something much more important. Indeed, we could become bored with something 
that we think should not bore us. Imagine, for instance, a judge bored with justice, 
a doctor bored with caring for patients, a parent bored with the well-being of their 
children, or a monk bored with prayer. We might be quick to note that such 
feelings of boredom are not, morally speaking, on par with our ordinary 
experiences of boredom. What the judge, doctor, or parent are feeling are instead 
indications that a more serious boredom is present. Depending on their particular 
circumstances, their boredom might be morally inappropriate or even grounds for 
the assignment of blame.  
 
Type B: Profound because of its scope. Boredom becomes profound when its 
scope turns expansive. Whereas we are usually bored with particular things and 
activities, it is possible to become bored with something much broader: ourselves, 
life, or the world itself (see Maltsberger, Sakinofsky, and Jha 2000). This notion 
of boredom might be related to perceived life boredom (see Tam, Van Tilburg, 
and Chan 2021) and could indicate an inability to find sources of engagement, 
interest, or meaning in many domains of our life (see also Heidegger 1995). 
 
Type C: Profound because of its frequency. A different type of profound boredom 
might arise when we experience state boredom often. Regardless of its cause, 
such an increase in the frequency of the experience of boredom can bring about 
important changes in the manner in which we experience ourselves and the world 
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(see Elpidorou this volume) and can have problematic consequences for our well-
being (Elpidorou 2017; Vodanovich and Watt 2016; cf. Williams 1973). 
 
Type D: Profound because of its duration. Whereas frequent boredom is 
worrisome or potentially problematic because we experience state boredom 
frequently, there can be a different type of profound boredom which gains its 
gravity from the fact that it lasts much longer than state boredom. Such type of 
boredom might be the affective “soundtrack” of our lives—we almost always 
experience it, or, if it is not constantly present, its experience, whenever it arises, 
lasts for an extended period of time. Such a chronic affective condition pervades 
and affects many of our everyday dealings.  
 
Type E: Profound because of its intensity. Boredom may become profound when 
the intensity of the experience of boredom increases. It might still be the case that 
we are bored infrequently, and that boredom has not become a chronic condition. 
Nonetheless, when we experience this type of boredom, we find it, because of its 
intensity, overwhelming.  
 
Type F: Profound because of its cause. Boredom could become profound because 
of its cause. If the cause of boredom lies in us or in our social or environmental 
conditions, boredom has the potential to transform our lives. It is a part of who we 
are (either personally or socially), and thus escape from this type of boredom 
becomes exceedingly hard.  
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Although I presented the above types of profound boredom as separate subtypes, they 
often co-exist and interact with each other. For instance, profound boredom caused by 
environmental conditions that are resistant to change will likely give rise to frequent, and 
perhaps even chronic, boredom. The same could hold for a type of boredom that is 
expansive in terms of its scope: if life itself bores us, then we should expect that we will 
be bored most of the time (see, e.g., Bargdill 2000; Maltsberger, Sakinofsky, and Jha 
2000; Moravia 2011 [1960]).  
 Knowing the various types of boredom is important. It allows us to better 
understand the history of boredom and the various discourses concerning boredom; it also 
safeguards us from conceptual errors when discussing boredom. What is more, the 
aforementioned taxonomy permits us to mark properly the present object of inquiry. 
When considering whether boredom is morally significant, I shall focus on two types of 
boredom: (1) the simple, everyday boredom (i.e., boredom as a transient affective state 
that is largely situation dependent, or “state boredom”) and (2) the type of boredom that 
is due to lasting personality characteristics (“trait boredom”). There are two main reasons 
for this decision. First, these two types of boredom, state boredom and trait boredom, are 
the focus of many contemporary analyses and empirical studies of boredom. As a result, 
we are, I believe, in a good position to articulate their moral significance. Second, the 
other types of boredom that I delineated, are, of course, important, yet it is unclear that 
they are not in some sense reducible to state boredom, trait boredom, or their 
combination. A straightforward case can be made about Type A, C, and E: all of them 
appear to be forms of state boredom. Type A is state boredom that is about specific 
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objects or situations; Type B is frequent state boredom; and Type E is intense state 
boredom. If Type F is due to individual psychological characteristics, then it is trait 
boredom. If it arises instead because of stable material, social, or environmental 
conditions, then it could be thought to be a form of state boredom that is due to some 
inescapable eliciting conditions. Type B and D are harder to reduce to state and trait 
boredom. Regarding Type B, it is unclear whether one’s boredom with life or the world is 
a form of state boredom. The intelligibility of this proposed identification will depend, 
among other things, on whether the subject of this type of boredom also experiences a 
desire to find activities that are stimulating, meaningful, or interesting to the subject—I 
take this desire to be a necessary component of state boredom (see section 4). Regarding 
Type D, the duration of this type of profound boredom rules out an identification with 
state boredom. Nonetheless, it could still be a form of trait boredom, especially if it 
involves the perception that one’s life is boring (see Tam, Van Tilburg, and Chan 2021).  
Having said that, I do not insist that all forms of boredom reduce, one way or 
another, to state boredom or trait boredom. It is possible that there are forms of boredom 
that are genuine types of boredom (not varieties of depression or apathy) and which 
cannot be explained in terms of state boredom or trait boredom. This potential concession 
does not take away from what the rest of the introduction has to offer—it simply entails 
that there is more to be said about possible varieties of boredom and their moral 
significance.  
Before concluding this section, I would like to raise one last issue. Is state 
boredom an emotion or not? Several chapters in this volume address this question. 
Contributions by Meagher and Robbins, Bortoloti and Allifi, and Yucel and Westgate all 
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provide reasons to think that state boredom should be taken to be an emotion. On the 
contrary, in her chapter, Yao offers an alternative conceptualization of state boredom, 
arguing that it ought to be understood as a cognitive appetite. Additionally, it has also 
been suggested that state boredom is (or can be) a mood insofar as it is a psychological 
state that lacks (or can lack) a specific intentional object (e.g., Feldges and Pieczenko 
2020; Heidegger 1995). The question of whether state boredom is an emotion or not is 
undoubtedly of great theoretical and practical importance. For the purposes of the 
introduction, I operate under the assumption that state boredom is an emotion. (I defend 
this view in Elpidorou 2018b and in press.) All the same, the claims that I advance 
concerning state boredom’s relation to morality hold (more or less) regardless of whether 
state boredom is ultimately an emotion, a mood, a cognitive attitude, or some other kind 
of psychological state.  
 
3. Boredom as a Personality Trait 
What does it mean to say that boredom is a personality trait? Putting aside general 
skepticism concerning the existence of personality traits, a personality trait, if it exists, 
must be (i) enduring, (ii) measurable, and (iii) a causally relevant characteristic of an 
individual’s behavior. First, it is enduring both insofar as it is long lasting and insofar as 
it cannot be induced or alleviated by limited exposure to some endogenous or exogenous 
condition. In other words, a personality trait can neither be too easily acquired nor too 
easily dispensed with, and once possessed, it is thought to be a stable characteristic of the 
individual. Second, a trait must be measurable in some way—otherwise we will not be 
able to ascertain its existence and the extent to which an individual possesses it. Third, a 
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trait must be causally relevant insofar as observed outcomes can be attributed to the 
presence (or lack) of the trait. Such a requirement is important for at least two reasons. 
On the one hand, the requirement entails that a personality trait is something over and 
above the set of occurrences of its corresponding state, when such a state exists. In the 
case of boredom, to possess the trait of boredom it is not sufficient to experience state 
boredom frequently. The experience of boredom (or our responses to it) must be, at least 
partly, due to some psychological characteristic that we possess. On the other hand, the 
requirement allows us to account for observed interpersonal differences. The existence of 
a trait helps us to explain why different individuals may behave differently when faced 
with similar situations.  
There have been several attempts to operationalize and assess the presence of trait 
boredom (Vodanovich 2003; Vodanovich and Watt 2016). Amongst them, the Boredom 
Proneness Scale (BPS) (Farmer and Sundberg 1986), a multi-item self-report scale, has 
been the most widely used measure of trait boredom. It was devised with the aim of 
measuring boredom proneness: an individual’s “tendency toward experiencing boredom” 
(1986, 5). The original format of BPS consisted of 28 items that were marked either as 
true or false. It was later revised to be scored on a 7-point Likert-type scale (Vodanovich 
and Kass 1990).  
Despite its use in numerous studies, there are known issues with BPS and 
subsequent attempts to revise this measure (see also Gana, Broc, and Bailly 2019; 
Mercer-Lynn, Bar, and Eastwood 2014; Struk et al. 2017). Here I mention two. First, 
there is no consensus regarding the factorial structure of BPS (Ahmed 1990; Gana and 
Akremi 1998; Struck et al. 2017; Vodanovich and Kass 1990; Vodanovich, Wallace, and 
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Kass 2005) and some have even reported that the original BPS lacks a replicable factorial 
structure (Melton and Schulenberg 2009). Second, boredom researchers have voiced 
concerns regarding the theoretical underpinnings of BPS and its external validity. For 
one, it has been suggested that, as a measure, BPS fails to distinguish between frequency 
of the occurrence of boredom and one’s inability to cope with the experience of boredom 
when that arises (Mercer-Lynn, Bar, and Eastwood 2014; Danckert et al. 2018). In 
addition, work by Tam, Van Tilburg, and Chan (2020) has shown that there are at least 
three distinct characterizations of boredom proneness (boredom frequency, boredom 
intensity, and perception of life boredom), each of which represents some aspect of 
boredom proneness.  
There are important psychometric and conceptual issues with existing measures of 
trait boredom (see Gana, Broc, and Bailly 2019). Such issues emphasize the pressing 
need for conceptual clarity when it comes to the very notion of trait boredom and for 
improved instruments to assess its presence. Nonetheless, measures of trait boredom 
(specifically BPS and shorter forms of BPS) have yielded consistent results. Specifically, 
available research reveals that trait boredom is a reliable indicator of poorer well-being, 
at-risk behavior and impulsivity, depression, difficulties in sustaining attention, and 
decreased purpose in life (for reviews, see Elpidorou 2017; Vodanovich 2003; 
Vodanovich and Watt 2016). These known and robust associations between trait 
boredom, on the one hand, and mental health issues and problematic behavior, on the 
other hand, demonstrate both the clinical significance of trait boredom and its relevance 
in understanding a host of behaviors. In turn, the value and need of a better understanding 
of trait boredom is dictated by theoretical positions that take characteristics of individuals 
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to be important determinants of their experience of boredom (Mercer-Lynn, Bar, and 
Eastwood 2014; see also Fisher 1993; Hamilton 1981; Neu 2000). In sum, trait boredom 
is an important theoretical construct that demands our attention. As a consequence, the 
moral significance of trait boredom ought to be considered. 
 
4. Boredom as an Affective State 
As a transient affective state, state boredom is a major part of human existence. It is 
experienced often and widely (Chin et al. 2017; Goetz et al. 2014; Larson and Richards 
1991; Smith et al. 2015), by individuals of all genders and ages, and by members of 
different cultures (Gana and Akremi 1998; Musharbash 2007; Ng et al. 2015; Sundberg et 
al. 1991; Vodanovich, Watt, and Piotrowski 1997). It typically arises in situations that are 
perceived to be monotonous or lacking in novelty or meaning (Thackray, Bailey, and 
Touchstone 1977; Van Tilburg and Igou 2012), that cannot grasp our attention (Hunter 
and Eastwood 2018), that fail to engage sufficiently or optimally our cognitive resources 
(Csikszentmihalyi 1975), or that are low in perceived autonomy (van Hooft and van 
Hooff 2018; Fisher 1993; cf. Fenichel 1953). 
Most of us have little trouble recognizing boredom and distinguishing it from 
other related affective experiences (Goldberg et al. 2011; Van Tilburg and Igou 2012; but 
see Svendsen 2005). First and foremost, boredom is a felt psychological state 
characterized by its aversive phenomenology (Harris 2000; Hartocollis 1972; Mikulas 
and Vodanovich 1993; Pekrun et al. 2010; Todman 2003; Vogel-Walcutt et al. 2012). 
Although the felt unpleasantness of boredom is perhaps its most obvious feature, its 
phenomenology carries a complexity that is often underappreciated. Boredom is reported 
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to be experienced both as an apathetic and as an agitated state and co-occurs with other 
negative emotions and affective states (Chin et al. 2017; Goetz et al. 2014; Harris 2000; 
Martin, Sadlo, and Stew 2006; Steinberger, Moeller, and Schroeter 2016). It involves 
feelings of apathy, weariness, listlessness, but also of aggravation and frustration 
(Fahlman et al. 2013; Harris, 2000; Martin, Sadlo, and Stew 2006; O’Brien 2014). 
Moreover, the phenomenological character of the experience of boredom is neither stable 
over time nor invariable through situations—it appears to change depending on 
endogenous or exogenous factors (Eastwood et al. 2012; Danckert et al. 2018; Elpidorou 
2020a; Mills and Christoff 2018; van Hooft and van Hooff, 2018; Westgate 2020; 
Westgate and Wilson 2018).  
Boredom is also characterized by its volitional character. It is crucial to note that 
boredom is not apathy (Goldberg et al., 2011; Nisbet 1982): only the former involves a 
desire for alternative engagement (Fahlman et al. 2013). Indeed, boredom can be 
separated from other negative emotions in terms of its volitional content and action-
tendencies (Van Tilburg and Igou 2012, 2017a). In particular, the experience of boredom 
is not exhausted by its associated phenomenology. When one is bored, one also itches to 
escape one’s situation.   
In terms of its cognitive elements or characteristics, boredom has been associated 
with attentional difficulties, negative appraisals regarding one’s situation, the perception 
of a slower passage of time, and mind wandering (for a review, see Elpidorou 2018a). 
The first two characteristics deserve further mention. On the one hand, attentional 
difficulties have long been implicated in the experience of boredom and have been used 
either to define boredom (i.e., boredom is characterized essentially by an inability to pay 
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attention) (Damrad-Frye and Laird 1989; Hamilton 1981; Leary et al. 1986), or to explain 
how and why it arises (attentional difficulties are the necessary or sufficient conditions of 
the experience of boredom) (Hunter and Eastwood 2018; Tam et al. in press; Westgate 
and Wilson 2018), or to account for its experiential profile (boredom’s different 
characteristics—e.g., its phenomenology or volitional component—can be explained in 
terms of attentional mechanisms; see, e.g., Eastwood et al. 2012). On the other hand, 
researchers have also implicated the presence of negative appraisals in the experience of 
boredom. Again, similarly to attentional difficulties, the hypothesized role of these 
negative appraisals varies. Sometimes negative appraisals are thought to be the 
psychological or cognitive antecedents of boredom. That is, boredom arises because we 
have appraised our situation to be monotonous, repetitive, lacking in meaning, lacking in 
novelty, involving no control, or being non-optimally engaging. Alternatively, negative 
appraisals have been thought to be a key characteristic of the very experience of 
boredom. For instance, some accounts of boredom hold that it is a state of perceived 
meaninglessness and an attempt to reestablish a sense of meaningfulness (Van Tilburg 
and Igou 2012, 2017a). It is worth noting that the presence of negative appraisals could 
be a consequence of attentional difficulties: we come to appraise our situation negatively 
because it cannot sufficiently engage our attention. But negative appraisals regarding 
one’s situation could also be the cause of attentional difficulties: we cannot pay attention 
to our situation precisely because we deem it to be meaningless, monotonous, repetitive, 
or uninteresting. 
The presence of some kind of negative appraisal about our situation appears to be 
a necessary part of the experience of boredom. In the same way that it is hard to imagine 
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a state of boredom that is not aversive, it is hard to imagine someone being bored and 
being satisfied with one’s situation. All this is to say that boredom is a state of 
discontent—indeed, it is one that we readily recognize as such. Furthermore, we typically 
attribute our felt discontent to our situation and not to our own inability to satisfactorily 
engage with the situation (Eastwood et al. 2012).   
 Boredom is also partly characterized by its physiological and neurological 
correlates, and by its motor and expressive features. Having said that, it is unclear as to 
whether or not these features are able to distinguish boredom from other affective states. 
Experimental work has not yet revealed a pattern of physiological activation (or 
deactivation) that is characteristic of boredom. In fact, a review of the literature yields 
findings that suggest that boredom is a low arousal state, a high arousal state, or a state of 
mixed arousal (for a review, see Elpidorou 2020a). This lack of consensus could mean 
that, even though boredom has a specific pattern of physiological activation (or 
deactivation) associated with its experience, we have not yet discovered it. Alternatively, 
the lack of consensus could mean that the experience of boredom does not give rise to 
any particular pattern of physiological arousal—perhaps, there are many patterns of 
physiological arousal that accompany the experience of boredom. Some have even 
argued that boredom should not be characterized in terms of its physiological arousal 
(Hill and Perkins 1985; Elpidorou 2020a). Regardless of how we settle this issue, extant 
findings regarding boredom’s physiological character indicate that during an experience 
of boredom we are disengaging from the task or situation at hand, preparing for an escape 
from the boring situation, or both (for more see, Elpidorou 2020a). 
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The neurological correlates of boredom are the subject of an open and active 
investigation. Research has found boredom to be correlated with lower beta activity in the 
left dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (Tabatabaie et al., 2014) and with the presence of alpha 
waves (Oswald 1962). Perone, Anderson and Weybright (2020) reported that the 
theta/beta ratio was lower during an easy (and thus boring) condition compared to an 
optimal condition—an indication that subjects experienced difficulties maintaining their 
attention in the former condition. Moreover, Perone and colleagues observed frontal 
alpha asymmetry, a measure of the presence of self-regulatory processes, and found that 
when the easy condition followed the optimal condition there was an increase in right 
frontal activity. The researchers interpret this finding as a sign that self-regulatory 
processes were engaged during the easy/boring condition (when the optimal condition 
preceded it). Other studies reported activation of parts of the default mode network 
during boredom (Danckert and Merrifield 2018; Ulrich et al.  2014), a finding that 
suggests that one’s attention is directed toward inner thoughts (Raffaelli, Mills, and 
Christoff 2018). These and other findings allow us to gain a better understanding of the 
neurological correlates of boredom. Importantly, they also pave the road for further 
investigations and permit us to test hypotheses regarding the relationship between, on the 
one hand, the experience of boredom, and, on the other hand, attention, mental effort, 
self-regulation, and mind wandering.  
Different movements and bodily postures have been associated with the 
experience boredom. For instance, it has been reported that during boredom there is an 
attenuation of movement (Walbott 1998). Furthermore, the upper body of bored subjects 
tends to collapse, and they raise their chin and lean their head backwards (Walbott 1998; 
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see also Bull 1987). Other studies reported that bored individuals tend to fidget (Martin, 
Sadlo, and Stew 2006), and even though they do not move a lot, they tend to perform 
sudden movements when they do move (Kroes 2005). Studies of the facial expressions of 
boredom are currently inconclusive—although some studies have associated boredom 
with specific action units, others have failed to find any significant and reliable 
associations (see Craig et al. 2008; Kroes 2005; Scherer and Ellgring 2007; McDaniel et 
al. 2007). Lastly, investigations into the speech of bored individuals reveal that it tends to 
be slow and soft, with a low and narrow pitch range (Johnstone and Scherer 2000; 
Scherer 2013). 
 In sum, state boredom is a transient, unpleasant experience that involves both an 
awareness of the presence of a situation that fails to sufficiently cognitively engage us 
(because it is not interesting, novel, exciting, or meaningful) and a strong desire for 
alternative and more fulfilling engagement. Due to its affective, volitional, cognitive, and 
physiological characteristics, boredom is a sign that we are facing a situation that is 
uninteresting, unengaging, or meaningless to us and a drive to seek escape from such a 
situation, when escape is possible.  
 
5. The Morality of Boredom 
What then can we say about the moral character of boredom—understood either as state 
or trait boredom? To address this question, we should consider whether the five theses 
that are meant to capture the moral significance of a psychological state or personality 
trait (ACTION THESIS, JUDGMENT THESIS, PERCEPTION THESIS, FLOURISHING THESIS, and 
APPROPRIATENESS THESIS) are true for boredom.  
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ACTION THESIS: Does boredom promote prosocial or antisocial conduct? The possibility 
that something like trait boredom can lead to destructive and antisocial behavior has been 
explored in detail by Eric Fromm (1973) who theorized that the pervasive or frequent 
experience of boredom can become intolerable, so much so that often times one can only 
escape it by harming oneself or others (see also Pfattheicher et al. 2020; Danckert this 
volume; Igou and Van Tilburg this volume). Fromm’s pessimistic outlook regarding the 
possible outcomes of trait boredom has found some empirical support. Correlational 
studies investigating individual differences in trait boredom report that trait boredom is 
related to maladaptive or antisocial tendencies and behaviors (e.g., sadistic tendencies, 
aggression, narcissism) and to actions indicative of low self-control and impulsiveness. 
(Dahlen et al. 2004; Isacescu and Danckert 2018; Mercer-Lynn et al. 2013; Moynihan, 
Igou, Van Tilburg 2017; Pfattheicher et al. 2020; Struk, Scholer, and Danckert 2016; 
Vodanovich and Watt 2016; Watt and Vodanovich 1992; Wink and Donahue 1997). 
Because of their correlational nature, these findings are incapable of proving the 
existence of a causal relationship between trait boredom and morally untoward behaviors. 
However, they suggest the possibility that trait boredom could be a morally significant 
personality trait insofar as it could lead to antisocial behavior.  
The role of trait boredom can be discerned perhaps more clearly when we 
consider specific examples of how the frequent experience of boredom can affect the 
behavior of an individual. Consider, for instance, the example of Niels Hoegel, a German 
nurse who has been convicted for killing of eighty-five patients, but who might have 
killed many more (Eddy 2017; Elpidorou 2020b). During his career as a nurse in different 
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medical institutions, Hoegel injected patients with drugs that caused them heart failure or 
circulatory collapse so that he could try to revive them. According to his own account, he 
was bored and was searching for a thrill to escape his tedious routine and an opportunity 
to impress his colleagues and supervisors. It is not known whether trait boredom (as this 
is measured by BPS) is a personality characteristic of Hoegel. Still, his case provides an 
illustration as to how the frequent experience of boredom could lead to antisocial actions 
(for other examples, see Yucel and Westgate this volume; Danckert this volume). 
Consistent with the suggestion that trait boredom can lead to harmful behaviors, 
Pfattheicher and colleagues (2020) have reported that sadistic tendencies were more 
pronounced among boredom prone individuals compared to those who were less prone to 
boredom. Indeed, the relationship between boredom proneness and sadistic tendencies 
was robust and was observed across a variety of contexts (e.g., sadism in the military, 
online trolling, sadistic fantasies) and across different countries and samples. These 
findings are once again correlational and thus preclude us from drawing any definitive 
conclusions regarding boredom’s causal role. Nonetheless, the reported association 
between boredom proneness and sadistic tendencies remained significant even after the 
researchers controlled for the Big Five and HEXACO personality models. Most 
importantly, in one of their studies (Study 5), Pfattheicher and colleagues found that 
experimentally inducing state boredom increased the likelihood that subjects would shred 
worms for pleasure. Such a finding is preliminary evidence in support of the claim that 
boredom causes sadistic behavior.  
It is crucially important to note that it matters a great deal why boredom might 
lead to these sorts of behavior. If it is because of either a need for excitement or novelty 
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(Bench and Lench 2019), or a desire to secure or reestablish a sense of meaningfulness 
(Igou and Van Tilburg this volume; Yucel and Westgate this volume), then boredom’s 
outcomes and action-tendencies are neither inherently moral nor immoral. Boredom 
motivates behaviors that can help us to alleviate its aversive experience, and although it is 
possible that some reactions to boredom are immoral, they need not be so. This 
realization is especially important when we turn our attention to state boredom. Our 
characterization of state boredom revealed that it is a response to a perceived 
dissatisfaction with one’s situation. Understood in that light, boredom appears to be a 
self-regulatory state: its aim or function is to resolve a perceived dissatisfaction by 
promoting change or action. As a result, the action that is born out of the experience of 
boredom might be immoral (Elpidorou 2020b; Pfattheicher et al. 2020), but it could also 
be moral (Van Tilburg and Igou 2017b) or, as it is commonly the case, amoral. Such a 
result does not render boredom (either as a state of trait) morally insignificant. Rather, it 
forces us to pay attention to the environmental and psychological factors that might 
facilitate or promote one type of response to boredom over another. It also underlines the 
need for emotional literacy when it comes to the experience of boredom and for the 
development of proper and efficient avoidance, mitigation, and response strategies to 
boredom (see Todman this volume).  
 
JUDGMENT THESIS: The relationship between emotions (or affective states in general) 
and moral judgments is a topic that has received a great deal of attention both in the 
history of philosophy (e.g., Hume 1978 [1740]; Kant 1964 [1785]; Smith 1759) but also 
in the interdisciplinary field of moral psychology (e.g., Haidt 2001; Nichols 2002; Prinz 
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2007). Scholars are actively examining whether emotions or affective states are a source 
or a consequence of moral judgments, whether it is possible to have moral judgments in 
the absence of emotions, or whether mature moral responses and judgments require the 
integration of both emotional and cognitive processes in order to best represent 
information regarding intentions, beliefs, and consequences. It would take us too far 
afield to try to summarize current debates concerning the potential role of affectivity in 
moral judgment. Indeed, the relationship between the two is complicated and 
multifaceted, and many different versions of it have been advanced and defended in the 
literature. Here, I follow a categorization presented by Avramova and Inbar (2013) and 
simply note three theses that explicate the possible relationship between emotions and 
moral judgments:  
 
Thesis 1: Emotions (or affective states) are the consequences of moral judgments. 
For instance, moral judgments about the permissibility or impermissible 
of an action might give rise to certain emotional states (e.g., anger or 
disgust).  
Thesis 2: Emotions amplify moral judgments. For example, emotions of disgust 
or anger amplify the wrongness of particular actions; whereas emotions 
of awe or gratitude amplify the perceived goodness of a person.  
Thesis 3: Emotions are necessary for moral judgments. This claim can be split 
into two: 
a. An emotional reaction is the necessary psychological antecedent 
for the formation of a moral judgment; or 
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b. Emotions ground moral judgments—that is, emotions moralize 
non-moral behaviors and situations insofar as it is on the basis of 
some emotional experience that we come to perceive certain 
behaviors or situations as moral or immoral.  
 
Only Thesis 2 and Thesis 3 assign a moral role to emotions. Thesis 1 is consistent with 
the view that moral judgments are the products of “pure” (non-emotional) cognitive 
processes. Although numerous experimental findings have been reported in support of 
either the claim that affective states (emotions, gut feelings, or intuitions of emotional 
nature) amplify moral judgments (Thesis 2) or the claim that such states play a causal or 
constitutive role in the formation of moral judgments (Thesis 3), the significance and 
exact interpretation of these findings remains unclear (Avramova and Inbar 2013; 
Huebner, Dwyer, and Hauser 2008; May 2018).  
In the case of boredom, there is no experimental evidence demonstrating that 
boredom directly affects moral cognition and judgment. Still, models of boredom that 
understand it to be a regulatory state that motivates individuals to search for meaning are 
consistent with the possibility that boredom (either as a trait or state) can indirectly 
influence moral judgment. Empirical findings in support of this hypothesis are scarce 
and, at this point, merely suggestive. Nonetheless, two studies are worth mentioning. 
First, Van Tilburg and Igou (2016) found that experimentally induced boredom leads to 
more extreme political orientations and that high boredom prone individuals tend to 
adhere to more extreme political views compared to low boredom prone individuals. Van 
Tilburg and Igou’s (2016) study does not reveal a relationship between boredom and 
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morality. Rather, it suggests the possibility that one’s political preferences can be 
influenced by one’s experiences of boredom. Although there are connections between our 
moral beliefs and our political views, these are neither obvious nor direct. Second, in a 
different set of studies, Van Tilburg and Igou (2011) reported that the onset of state 
boredom affected subjects’ attitudes concerning social identity. Specifically, state 
boredom was shown to increase valuation of their ingroups (as measured by subjects’ 
preference of an ingroup name over an outgroup name and by their positive evaluations 
of a symbol associated with their national ingroup) and the devaluation of outgroups (as 
measured by subjects’ willingness to dispense harsher punishment to a hypothetical 
outgroup offender compared to a hypothetical inground offender). Although important, 
such findings do not demonstrate that boredom causes or grounds moral judgments 
(Thesis 3). Nonetheless, they might serve as preliminary support for the claim that 
boredom, through its potential to motivate a search for meaning, amplifies certain pre-
existing moral opinions (Thesis 2), insofar as a stronger adherence to or focus on those 
opinions bolsters a sense of meaningfulness. In sum, the relationship between boredom 
and moral judgment has not been adequately explored in the literature. As such, this is a 
topic that deserves future attention. 
 
PERCEPTION THESIS: There is no evidence showing that boredom can affect the 
perception of morally salient facts. Nonetheless, given boredom’s intimate connection to 
attentional mechanisms, the relationship between boredom and moral perception should 
be explored further. It is well documented in the empirical literature that both trait and 
state boredom are linked to attentional difficulties (Eastwood et al. 2012; Hunter and 
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Eastwood 2018; Tam et al. in press). Indeed, extant research makes it clear that boredom 
cognitively disengages us from our situation. As a result, it is likely that during the 
experience of boredom we might miss morally salient facts. Such a conclusion is 
consistent with the affect-as-information model of emotions (Schwarz and Clore 1983, 
1988, 2003) and with reports that emotional states may affect attention (e.g., Gasper and 
Clore 2002). If boredom’s primary informational function is to convey the message that 
our current situation is uninteresting or meaningless to us, then we might be led to think 
that we should not pay attention to our situation. In light of its capacity to cognitively 
disengage us from a situation, boredom appears to be an affective experience that can 
hinder moral perception. More work, however, is needed in order to confirm or 
disconfirm this potential aspect of boredom.  
 
FLOURISHING THESIS: A large body of research has consistently found that measures of 
trait boredom are correlated, on the one hand, with the presence of maladaptive behaviors 
and, on the other hand, with states or conditions that are potentially harmful or worrisome 
(e.g., depression, alexithymia, and hopelessness; reduced life satisfaction; reduced 
meaning in life and self-determination) (see Vodanovich 2003; Vodanovich and Watt 
2016). Furthermore, a review of the available correlational data has shown that the 
presence of trait boredom is negatively related to several measures of hedonic and 
eudaimonic well-being: e.g., lower levels of subjective well-being, lower reported life-
satisfaction, lack of meaning in life, and reduction in autonomy (Elpidorou 2017). On the 
basis of this review, it was concluded that trait boredom is morally significant insofar as 
it is a serious impediment to living a flourishing life. Bargdill’s (2000) phenomenological 
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existential analysis of boredom offers complementary evidence insofar as it shows that 
life boredom, a construct closely related to trait boredom, might be harmful to individuals 
because it makes it harder for them to care for their projects and to pursue their goals. As 
such, trait boredom appears to be morally significant in the sense explicated by the 
FLOURISHING THESIS. Even though we must be mindful of the fact that there is not just 
one type of life that qualifies as the good life, a person that is often bored is likely to 
experience difficulties in their attempts to pursue a variety of projects that are constitutive 
of different notions of the good life.  
This result however does not readily apply to state boredom. Given our 
characterization of state boredom as largely situationally dependent, the frequency and 
intensity of the experience of state boredom will differ depending on the subjects’ 
circumstances, way of life, and psychological characteristics. In turn, subjects’ response 
to state boredom will also depend on what type of psychological and material resources 
are available to them. So, even though the experience of boredom might stand as an 
obstacle to the achievement of the good life for some, it will not be an obstacle for all. In 
fact, it seems that what is most important in such cases is not the experience of state 
boredom as such, but the underlying and often systemic conditions that give rise to 
boredom frequently and persistently and which make it harder for the experiencing 
subject to respond to it appropriately (Elpidorou this volume) 
Moreover, boredom may turn out to be a beneficial state if experienced 
infrequently and responded to correctly. For instance, it has been argued that the 
experience of state boredom can inform us of the presence of an unfulfilling or 
meaningless situation and, at the same time, can motivate us to escape from such a 
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situation (Bench and Lench 2013; Elpidorou 2014; Van Tilburg and Igou 2012). On 
account of that, boredom might contribute to eudaimonic well-being insofar as it propels 
us into situations that are more in line with our interests and which we find meaningful 
and important to us (Elpidorou 2018b, 2020a, in press). Others have suggested that 
boredom can lead to creative outcomes (Gasper and Middlewood 2014; Hunter et al. 
2016; Mann and Cadman 2014) and provide important epistemic benefits (Bortolotti and 
Aliffi this volume). However, it bears repeating that both the range of available responses 
to boredom and whether or not those would be beneficial to oneself heavily depend on 
the type of resources that one possesses (Todman this volume). For that reason, our 
ethical and social theories should consider how distributive and systemic injustices might 
disproportionally affect certain groups of individuals over others.  
 
APPROPRIATENESS THESIS: Is boredom, either as trait or state, morally appropriate or 
inappropriate? With regards to trait boredom, high boredom prone individuals experience 
impulse control deficits (Dahlen et al. 2004; Isacescu and Danckert 2018; Mercer-Lynn et 
al. 2013; Moynihan, Igou, Van Tilburg 2017; Watt and Vodanovich 1992; Leong and 
Schneller 1993), are more likely than low boredom prone individuals to engage in risk-
taking behavior (Dahlen et al. 2005; Kass, Beede, and Vodanovich 2010; Vodanovich 
and Watt 2016), and are prone to addictive behavior such as drug and alcohol abuse 
(Biolcati, Mancini, and Trombini 2018; LePera 2011; cf. Paulson, Coombs, and 
Richardson 1990), hypersexuality (Reid, Garos, and Carpenter 2011), and problem 
gambling (Blaszczynski, McConaghy, and Frankova 1990; see though Mercer and 
Eastwood 2010). If morality involves duties to oneself, in addition to duties to others, 
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then one could argue that the APPROPRIATENESS THESIS is true for trait boredom: morally 
speaking, we are better off not possessing this particular trait. This conclusion rests, 
however, on the rather contentious moral premise that engaging in risk-taking, impulsive, 
or potentially addictive behaviors is morally inappropriate.  
With regards to state boredom, most experiences of state boredom are morally 
neutral and thus having the affective experience of boredom is neither appropriate nor 
inappropriate. Still, our brief discussions of acedia and Type A profound boredom 
suggest, strongly I believe, that there are cases of state boredom that ought to be 
considered morally inappropriate. If we are bored by violations of human rights, the pain 
and suffering of others, or our own moral responsibilities, then we are the subjects of an 
experience that appears to be morally inappropriate.  
There has been little, if any, discussion as to whether there can be instances of 
state boredom that are morally appropriate. Is it ever the case that it is good or 
praiseworthy to be bored by something? It is unclear whether such examples exist. 
Boredom signals a lack of care with our situation; it is a stance of indifference and 
disengagement. Unless there are cases in which indifference or lack of care is the right 
reaction to have (viz., it is a moral and not merely appropriate or beneficial attitude), then 
state boredom is never a morally desirable state.1 But even if that is the case, it does not 
mean that state boredom has to be morally inappropriate. State boredom can also be—and 
indeed it is very often—morally neutral.  
 
Summary 
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Boredom’s moral character lies primarily in its ability to drive moral or immoral 
behavior, to hinder the pursuit of the good life when it is experienced frequently or 
chronically, and to potentially promote eudaimonic well-being, when experienced 
infrequently and responded to appropriately. In turn, boredom is also morally significant 
insofar as certain experiences of boredom are indicative of moral shortcomings or 
failures.  
 
6. Summaries of Chapters 
The present volume is the outcome of an interdisciplinary collaboration. In an attempt to 
advance our theoretical understanding of boredom and its relationship to morality, it 
brings together essays from different perspectives—philosophy; clinical, social, and 
personality psychology; and animal studies. The chapters that follow this introduction 
examine the character of boredom, its function and role in our personal and social lives, 
and its relationship to other emotions and psychological states. By doing so, they explore 
how the presence of boredom can make a moral difference.  
In the volume’s opening essay “From Electric Shocks to the Electoral College: 
How Boredom Steers Moral Behavior,” Meltem Yucel and Erin C. Westgate draw 
upon the Meaning and Attentional Components (MAC) model of boredom (Westgate and 
Wilson 2018) and consider the various causes and outcomes of the experience of 
boredom. They pay particular attention to how boredom can affect moral decision-
making and behavior and to the conditions which are conducive to either prosocial or 
antisocial behavior. Yucel and Westgate’s chapter also provides an informative and 
helpful overview of the ways in which emotions and affective states may impact moral 
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attention, decision-making, and conduct. As such, the chapter is an appropriate beginning 
point for readers interested in how an affective state like boredom may relate to morality.  
 In “The Existential Sting of Boredom: Implications for Moral Judgments and 
Behavior,” Eric Igou and Wijnand A.P. van Tilburg evaluate the moral character of 
boredom in light of a meaning-regulatory view of boredom. Such a view conceives of 
boredom as the signal of a potential or actual lack of meaning and, at the same time, as an 
attempt to reestablish or bolster a sense of meaningfulness. In previous work, Igou and 
Van Tilburg have provided theoretical and experimental support for this understanding of 
boredom (Van Tilburg and Igou 2011, 2012, 2017a). In their contribution to this volume, 
they consider what such a view of boredom can tell us about its moral character. By 
presenting different meaning-regulation processes related to the experience of boredom 
they articulate the conditions under which such processes can give rise to prosocial or 
antisocial behaviors. Their contribution makes evident both that situational factors can 
greatly affect the moral character of the outcomes of the experience of boredom and that 
the meaning-regulatory view carries great promise in elucidating boredom’s complex 
relationship to morality.  
In the next chapter, “Boredom and the Lost Self,” Shane W. Bench, Heather C. 
Lench, Yidou Wan, Kaitlyn Kaiser, and Kenneth A. Perez take up the important question 
of what happens to us when we are constantly or frequently bored. The authors examine 
the implications of the presence of trait boredom to the perception and development of 
our concept of self. They argue that if state boredom is an experiential indication that a 
goal has lost its value for the experiencing subject, then trait boredom, which is 
conceptualized as a propensity to experience boredom frequently, is a sign of a poor fit 
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between the person and the environment. Specifically, trait boredom indicates that there 
are no rewarding or valuable goals in the subject’s environment. Bench and colleagues 
provide empirical support for this understanding of trait boredom and develop the 
implications of the presence of trait boredom for our personal existence and well-being.  
The role of agency in boredom is considered in the next two chapters. In “‘Rage 
Spread Thin’: Boredom and Aggression,” James Danckert examines the relationship 
between boredom and aggression (see also Igou and Van Tilburg this volume). 
Specifically, Danckert asks whether there is something inherent in boredom that leads to 
aggressive acts. Although the two have been linked together, insofar as aggressive acts 
appear to follow the experience of boredom, Danckert argues that such a link does not 
demonstrate the immorality of boredom. Instead, the observed association between the 
two is explained by the fact that during the experience of boredom one’s sense of agency 
is threatened or disrupted. In an attempt to restore their sense of agency, bored 
individuals might find recourse in acts of aggression: Because of their tangible outcomes, 
such acts offer the subjects with an efficient way of reclaiming their agency and 
alleviating boredom. However, as Danckert shows, responding to boredom with 
aggression is not inevitable. Indeed, a functional account of boredom suggests that 
adaptive and beneficial responses to boredom are also available to us.  
 John D. Eastwood and Dana Gorelik zoom in on the nature of the crisis of agency 
that is characteristic, according to them, of boredom. In their chapter, “Losing and 
Finding Agency: The Crisis of Boredom,” they argue that boredom presents the 
experiencing agent with a conundrum that is almost impossible to solve: Boredom 
demands from the agent that they do something, yet it also prevents them from desiring 
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anything doable. In this way, Eastwood and Gorelik conceive of boredom as 
simultaneously both an opportunity and a danger. Depending on how one responds to 
boredom, one might reclaim (and even promote) one’s agency or further degrade one’s 
ability to act. The authors suggest ways in which one could effectively respond to the 
crisis of agency that lies at the heart of boredom. They underline, however, that structural 
forces can thwart individual agency and thus the task of reclaiming agency in the face of 
boredom is not merely personal but also social.  
 The social character of boredom is further highlighted in the two chapters that 
follow Eastwood and Gorelik’s contribution. In “Boredom Mismanagement and 
Attributions of Social and Moral Costs,” McWelling Todman considers and evaluates 
the commonly held belief that healthy adults ought to be able to regulate their experience 
of boredom in ways that promote group cohesion and minimize the possibility of 
antisocial or dangerous behavior. In his chapter, he presents different types of boredom 
management strategies that permit effective self-regulation and discusses how individuals 
who are not able to make proper use of such strategies are blamed and judged as having 
done something immoral. Todman cautions that moral judgments about individuals 
whose problematic behavior might be motivated by (or rooted in) boredom are often 
unfair. Such judgments may fail to consider how structural inequities in our society make 
it harder (sometimes even impossible) for socially marginalized individuals to acquire 
and practice effective boredom management skills in various institutional settings.  
 In my own contribution to the volume, “Boredom and Poverty: A Theoretical 
Model,” I continue the conversation regarding the manner in which social conditions 
may affect one’s experience of and response to boredom. I present and defend a 
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theoretical account that holds that low SES individuals are disproportionately negatively 
affected by boredom because of their social standing. The account holds that, compared 
to individuals of higher SES, individuals of low SES tend to experience boredom more 
frequently. Furthermore, because of the presence of constraints and of poverty’s effects 
on their psychology, individuals of low SES are placed in a disadvantageous position 
when dealing with boredom. Overall, their social standing renders them susceptible to the 
experience of boredom and makes it harder for them to respond to it in adaptive ways.  
The question of whether boredom can be a beneficial affective state has been 
considered before in the literature. Still, boredom’s possible connection to knowledge and 
self-knowledge has received far less. In their contribution, “The Epistemic Benefits of 
Irrational Boredom,” Lisa Bortolotti and Matilde Aliffi argue that state boredom can be 
both epistemically irrational and epistemically beneficial. They usefully explicate the 
notion of being epistemically rationally assessable and argue that boredom is a state that 
can be epistemically rationally assessable. In fact, they convincingly show that some 
cases of state boredom may turn to be epistemically irrational insofar as they provide the 
agent with information that conflicts with available evidence. All the same, the authors 
argue that even though state boredom may be epistemically irrational it can still offer 
important epistemic benefits.  
 The most common conceptualization of state boredom in the relevant literature 
places it in the category of emotion. Indeed, many of the chapters in this volume make 
explicit use of this conceptualization. In “Boredom as Cognitive Appetite,” Vida Yao 
offers an alternative understanding of boredom. In her contribution, Yao introduces and 
characterizes the notion of cognitive appetite, distinguishes it from that of emotion, and 
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argues that boredom should be considered to be a cognitive appetite. Importantly, Yao 
draws out the benefits of this way of understanding boredom and illustrates how the 
proposed understanding can make sense of our ethical assessments of boredom and 
interest.  
 In “Boredom, Interest, and Meaning of Life,” Wendell O’Brien takes a close 
look at the relationship between boredom and interest. He argues that lack of interest is a 
necessary condition for boredom (understood either as a temporary affective experience, 
personality trait, or a chronic, existential condition). In addition, he argues that interest is 
a necessary component of subjective meaning of life, insofar as a life that is experienced 
as meaningful has to be also experienced as interesting to the subject. These two 
conclusions allow O’Brien to clarify the sense of interest that is of relevance to subjective 
meaning and to explicate boredom’s connection to the meaningful.  
In “Parallels to Boredom in Non-Human Animals,” Rebecca K. Meagher and 
Jesse Robbins take up the question of animal boredom. Do non-human animals 
experience boredom? If so, how can we tell? And what is the relationship between human 
and animal boredom? In their contribution, the authors provide a helpful review of 
evidence that shows that animals exhibit signs of boredom in situations that appear to be 
analogous to ones that induce boredom in humans. They also compare conceptualizations 
of the human experience of boredom to operational definitions of boredom that are used 
in the study of animal boredom. The authors argue for the need of a comparative 
approach to the study of boredom and conclude their chapter by discussing the practical 
and moral implications of animal boredom as these relate to animal welfare and ethics.  
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 The edited volume concludes with Josefa Ros Velasco’s contribution, “The Long 
Hard Road Out of Boredom.” In her chapter, Ros Velasco traces the moral history of 
boredom and explores the ways in which our attitudes concerning the experience of 
boredom have been transformed through the centuries and shaped by various cultural 
forces. One of Ros Velasco’s chief aims is to make clear that boredom’s relationship to 
morality has been a topic that received considerable attention in the history of Western 
tradition. After canvasing the rich history of boredom, Ros Velasco highlights boredom’s 
adaptive function and potential benefits and underscores the dangers of pathologizing it.  
It is my hope that the present volume will not only allow readers to become more 
familiar with boredom and its moral significance but that it will also inspire and inform 
future research. As the essays clearly demonstrate, the study of boredom has a storied 
past and lively present. It also has a bright future.2  
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1 I suppose one could argue that an appropriate dosage of boredom (with our own skills 
and abilities or with our social relationships and competencies) might be necessary in 
order to better oneself. And if bettering oneself is a moral duty, then boredom turns out to 
be a morally desirable state. A somewhat similar thought is expressed by Williams (1973) 
who writes: “Just as being bored can be a sign of not noticing, understanding or 
appreciating enough, so equally not being bored can be a sign of not noticing, or not 
reflecting, enough” (95). The total absence of boredom might thus indicate a failure to 
sufficiently attend to oneself.  
2 I am grateful to G. M. Trujillo, Jr. and Wendell O’Brien for detailed and incredibly 
helpful comments on a previous version of this introduction.  
